Zack Scott, former Mets Acting GM and four-time champion with the Red Sox, empowers sports operations and individuals to win through Four Rings Sports Solutions. He specializes in data-driven strategies and leadership development. His Sports Ops Launchpad helps aspiring sports ops pros break into the industry. Connect with him on LinkedIn here. Zack will be contributing periodically to MLB Trade Rumors.
As Florida’s Grapefruit League approaches its halfway point, Yankees and Mets fans are already venting their fury. Prized offseason pitching acquisitions Sean Manaea and Frankie Montas are injured before even throwing a regular-season pitch for the Mets. Yankees ace Gerrit Cole is also hurt and facing the prospect of possibly missing the entire season.
Having given Montas and Manaea a combined $109MM, the Mets faithful want to know how the team doctors green-lit those deals. Likewise, Yankees supporters question what Cole’s physical exams missed after the Bombers convinced him not to opt out and walk away from the $144MM left on his deal.
As a former baseball executive, I’ve fielded those same frustrated queries. Forecasting player injury risk involves far more art than science, often leaving teams and fans dissatisfied. I hear these complaints frequently since I live in the NY metro area and contribute to SNY’s weeknight show, Baseball Night in New York.
There’s rarely a satisfying answer because the assessment process is highly imperfect. Every veteran pitcher has wear and tear if you look hard enough. Acute injuries occur after the fact. Let’s examine how it typically works, its key flaws, and some ways it could be improved.
The Current (Flawed) Process
When a free agent agrees to terms, the deal is almost always contingent on a physical. The team’s medical staff examines the player, including clinical evaluations, strength and flexibility tests, and MRI imaging of joints like shoulders and elbows for pitchers.
Experts from across the organization weigh in with opinions that a head athletic trainer or performance director synthesizes into an overall risk rating for the GM. For trades, it’s a similar review of medical records, but there’s no in-person exam.
There are several issues with this approach:
• Doctors and trainers interpret MRI findings differently
• Individual expert biases color the assessments
• Lack of standardized, objective metrics
• Siloed information without enough collaboration
• Over-reliance on a single organizational voice
• Underutilization of advanced data analytics
In this high-stakes environment, a process reliant on human judgment is open to significant error.
A System Ripe for Abuse
Valid, complete information is critical for proper risk assessments. However, in this ultra-competitive industry, teams are motivated to gain edges wherever possible, sometimes unethically.
When I was with the Red Sox in 2016, we traded top pitching prospect Anderson Espinoza to the Padres for Drew Pomeranz. Our medical staff reviewed the records San Diego shared and signed off on the deal.
After Pomeranz reported, we discovered he was managing multiple health issues that were not disclosed to us. ESPN reported that the Padres instructed their athletic trainers to maintain two sets of files—one for internal use and a sanitized one for trade purposes. While MLB never divulged details, they investigated and concluded there was wrongdoing. GM A.J. Preller was suspended for 30 days (Take that, wrist!).
The incident eroded trust so much that any subsequent transactions with the Padres were thought to need additional vetting by a third party. It exemplified the system’s vulnerability to exploitation and dependence on clubs exchanging information in good faith.
From Biased Experts to Big Mistakes
Even when injury records are complete, human bias and error can still lead teams astray. As the Mets’ Acting GM before the 2021 season, I explored signing veteran starter Rich Hill. Our medical team reviewed his records and strongly recommended against the move, given his age and injury history. While I had reservations about the assessment, I ultimately decided to heed their advice and pass on Hill.
In retrospect, that was a mistake. Hill signed with the Rays for a reasonable $2.5MM and gave them nearly 100 solid innings. When we traded for him that July, I learned Rich was understandably frustrated that our medical assessment was pessimistic months earlier.
I called Rich to clarify the situation and take responsibility for the decision. While our assessor likely took a conservative approach, as the GM, I had to own the final call. This experience reinforced how these assessments can vary based on the individuals and organizational histories involved. Years prior, former Mets performance staff members took bullets, rightly or wrongly, for player injuries, influencing the current staff to take a more risk-averse approach.
Moving forward, I pushed our group to focus more on objective data and collaborate across silos to mitigate individual biases. We had to balance risks with potential rewards and understand that perfect prediction is impossible. Judgment calls wouldn’t always work out, but we needed to approach them with discipline, openness, and the bigger picture in mind.
That same month, we selected Vanderbilt pitcher Kumar Rocker 10th overall in the draft. After the pick, we did a deep dive into his medicals, which included multiple expert opinions. Despite Rocker’s talent, we ultimately decided not to offer him a contract due to the high perceived risk. A year later, the Rangers drafted Rocker third overall and signed him for $5.2MM. Two teams evaluating similar information came to opposite conclusions. Rocker is now a top-50 prospect, excelling in the minors. Our assessment was clearly wrong, and it cost us at least a valuable trade chip and potentially a frontline starter. That’s how impactful these judgments can be.
Finding a Better Way Forward
To reduce costly human bias and error, MLB and individual clubs must evolve to a more data-driven, objective methodology. Some suggested improvements:
MLB should:
• Standardize protocols for medicals, physicals, and imaging
• Mandate sharing of training and biomechanical data
• Use validated tools to assess psychological factors
Teams should:
• Leverage AI and machine learning to analyze images (e.g., MRI) and predict injury risk
• Develop personalized biomechanical and kinetic player models
• Improve collaboration between medical, performance, and analytics staff
• Have subjective evaluators predict outcomes (e.g., innings pitched) and assign confidence scores
By taking these steps and focusing on hard data while still valuing expert insights, teams can optimize the art and science of this process. It won’t be perfect but will be significantly better than current practices.
Progressive teams are already moving in this direction, and others are sure to follow as they recognize the competitive advantages it brings. Smarter, more precise health forecasting is the future of player acquisitions. Hopefully, fans will soon have more confidence in the medical evaluations that drive roster decisions.
Ridiculous
Why? Makes perfect sense to me.
Van – Agreed!
This was a great article by Zack, and it’s encouraging to hear changes are coming that will hopefully prevent at least some of these instances where players are hiding injuries prior to signing huge contracts.
In the meantime, MLB should immediately implement in-person exams and MRI’s when a player is acquired via trade.
And medicals should be available to all MLB teams PRIOR to the draft for all potential first round draft picks.
The article is an interesting read from a GM perspective. The real problem is *why* these injuries are occurring so frequently. No other word to use than “overuse”.
I played in college (90s) and the offseason was basketball games and frequent cage work. But very little throwing.
Now my son is playing baseball in high school and these kids are playing year round. Pitchers have maybe 1 month off (at most). Look no further than overworked players and their overworked arms.
Makes me more in awe of Nolan Ryan and how he was able to take care of himself even before a lot of the modern treatments and methods.
Yeah, if you could only bottle and sell luck, imagine the price you could get.
It’s called weed…
I wouldn’t call it luck considering Ryan is only the most extreme example. There were a lot more pitchers like Carlton, Seaver, Blyleven, Jenkins, Perry, Sutton, Koosman, Kaat that were able to pitch far more than modern pitchers with relatively few injuries. Perhaps instead of subscribing to “modern treatments” we should go back to the type of preparation and treatment they did way back when.
It was less about Nolan Ryan taking care of himself, and more that he possessed a singular assortment of biomechanics that let him pitch very hard for a very long time without ruining his frame. Back in his heyday they did a biomechanic study of him and came away basically saying he was a unicorn.
It sounds like if all of the recommendations are followed and a team decides not to sign someone based on this new-and-improved confidence score and that player goes on to have a healthy, productive season, that will prove that the new system is terrible.
At least that’s what the dumb Rich Hill/Kumar Rocker examples suggest.
Terrible? Hyperbole much? You would have to look at the time frame that matches the contract years you were negotiating for a comparison to do you any good. So if you are negotiating a three year deal (Hill likely was not) or a five year deal like Atlanta had with Jeff Hoffman until they didn’t like his physical, so he ended up signing elsewhere on a 3 year deal at less AAV. If the shoulder was the concern, and after 5 years he was fine, then they made a mistake.
The Hill and Rocker examples weren’t dumb, a lot of people like to get real examples from people involved. Why such a sourpuss?
The Hill and Rocker examples are dumb because they aren’t evidence of anything but are presented as proof of a broken system. OMG, the team’s medical evaluators thought 40-year-old Rich Hill was a high risk of injury/underperformance but he actually pitched 100 solid innings the next season. That doesn’t mean the assessment was some big mistake. There will always be a range of future outcomes and the fact that Hill happened to have a decent season is virtually meaningless as far as determining whether the system is broken.
The same is true for Kumar Rocker, especially since he is comparing his performance a year later and when a smaller contract amount was at issue.
I’m also generally not a fan of results-oriented analysis. You should consider whether a decision was poorly reasoned at the time it was made, not based on whether the results happened to fall on one side or the other of a range of possible outcomes.
And if you want to make an argument that the system is broken based on past evaluations, give me some statistics that demonstrate it, not just anecdotal evidence that is proof of nothing. Or tell me something that was incorrect about the assessments of Rich Hill or Kumar Rocker at the time they were made, or at least something that was wrong with the processes followed to make those assessments, not just that if you knew the players were going to perform the way they did you might have made different decisions.
All that being said, of course improvements can and should be made to medical evaluations. The article just seems to demonstrate poor reasoning.
Probably out of respect or privacy laws, the article doesn’t mention the times the reviewing saved the team millions. I still can’t believe Preller got just thirty days. He should have gotten at least a year if not a permanent ban.
Agree on privacy and agree on Preller. Intentionally keeping two sets of files should have been a lifetime ban with the opportunity to appeal years later like Coppy from the Braves. His ban was lifted but no one is foolish enough to hire him. He didn’t do anything that hurt anyone unlike Preller
Sports Teams should always consult with the renowned, leading “doctors” in the MLB Trade Rumors comments section before all major medical decisions. They always employ the benefit of hindsight.
Interesting read. One question that I would ask from this article is if there’s a correlation between medically “progressive” evaluations, as Zack termed it, and on-field success or at least success in minimizing games lost to injury?
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It is fascinating to hear insider details of these transactions that we read about–I enjoy getting Mr. Scott’s insights and hearing about his experiences in the industry.
Quick question: what specifically is being referred to when he says MLB should use validated tools to assess psychological factors? Would this be assessing for mental illness? How would such an evaluation be implemented (every player to be evaluated at the start of each season, etc)?
I am also highly intrigued by the psychological factors used in evaluation and would like to read more on this process.
Kumar Rocker had surgery after the Mets did not sign him later in September. Scott failed to mention that.
It’s ridiculous that someone like Cole could be given $36 million to do nothing but rehab; I believe with most employers, after a few weeks of inability to work pay is reduced or eliminated. Why shouldn’t they just pay them the league minimum salary or some fraction of their regular salary (whichever is higher). I realize it’s not necessarily the player’s fault he’s hurt, but it’s not the club’s either. NO ONE is gonna starve on the pro-rated league minimum salary ($760,000). Hate to see any club hamstrung financially OR competitively by one injury. BEFORE ANYBODY SAYS SO, YES, I REALIZE THE PLAYER’S UNION WOULD NEVER AGREE TO THIS. Just wanted wanted to throw this idea out there and see the responses.
Lmao
Derek, why? The player also still gets service time. The MLBPA would never agree but it should stop the clock to free agency if the team wants to extend the contract by paying the last year of the contract’s deal for an extra season when the player misses 50% plus of a year.
Because you guys keep shooting your argument in the foot. Both of you have stated the union wouldn’t agree. This is a useless thought experiment. Teams are pushing these players to the limit, why would they sacrifice the protections that they have been fighting for since the days of the reserve clause?
You’re not going to get the answers you are looking for because the full contract is guaranteed. I am sure there is language in them for injuries. That isn’t something that your standard non-baseball employees have, a guaranteed contract.
jam – Have you ever been on Worker’s Comp? It usually covers at least 67% of the person’s salary.
Expecting a player with a $35M salary to accept just $760K prorated if he’s injured on the job? No offense, but that’s absurd.
I get your point….but it’s MORE absurd to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars for NADA. Besides, the pro-rated $760 is pretty good money for MOST people.
Yeah I’m sure players are going to play REALLY hard knowing they lose 95% of their income the moment they get hurt on the job.
Every owner in the league has enough money to live on the league minimum for over 100 years. If that’s enough money, why don’t they just spend more on the team to make up for the injuries?
Every owner in the league could add $30 million to their payroll and “not starve”, why is $760,000 enough for the players we pay to watch but not the owners?
Because he got injured doing his job.
Fair argument….but what about the times they get hurt when they’re NOT working?
Interesting reading, but it seems this analysis can be summarized by saying that players fall into two categories: those who have been injured, and those who will be, and predicting when is beyond medical science. As a fan I don’t feel any need to be reassured about this medical evaluation process. I figure the teams are mostly doing what they can to assess risk. They are the ones spending the money, after all.
Probably the healthiest outlook I have seen on this subject. I am like you, if my teams flags the medical, which happened with Jeff Hoffman and also a few years ago with a first round pick Carter Stewart (I think thats his name) then I assume it was for a good reason. I also assume when they don’t that it’s also for a good reason. Not my money, even though I am sure someone is going to refute that by pointing out ticket costs or baseball TV package costs. I look at those costs the exact same way as going to a movie or having a streaming service, they are for my entertainment. They aren’t an investment.
Great article, but if I see the phrase “leverage AI and machine learning “ one more time I’m gonna puke. It’s the most overused quote in vogue today. *insert company name* leverages AI and machine learning to *insert whatever* ITS ENOUGH !!
Scott forgot to mention that Kumar rocker underwent surgery on his arm.
Thanks to Zack for sharing an inside. Look at the process in such clear terms. One thing I am curious about is how a GM functions when there is the extra layer of a President of Baseball Operations. Is there any finality to a GM’s decision in this case, or are they completely beholden to the PBO?
What so different today than 50 years ago. Is it plain old throwing volume? Are today’s players not tough enough ? Too many steroids ?
Today’s analytics make some sense but there are exceptions. Nothing is perfect I guess
What if you have a good prospect who has dodged bro g on injured list but has structural issues. But goes out and gets out and doesn’t miss time. Sign him or send him to independent leagues ?
The most frustrating part are the stupid ignorant health related posts by clueless fans who think they are doctors
You seem agitated, maybe you would like your PRN now?
/s
I like the idea of biomechanics for a pitcher to spot potential flaws in their delivery but the fact of the matter is that throwing a baseball is not a natural function and there are only so many bullets in the gun. You could have a perfect delivery and it still just takes one wrong pitch (grip, mechanics, velocity etc) to blow out your elbow or shoulder. I find it strange that 99% of arm injuries are elbow/TJS as opposed to some years ago when it was almost always Rotator Cuff /Labrum surgery.
Interesting article. Personally, I’d like to see a three day “exam” period after mid-season trades where medical exams could take place. Some teams are a little less forthright in their “selling” of players at the deadline. Gamesmanship should stop at injuries.
After the Mets did not sign him, Kumar Rocker underwent surgery in September. Zack Scott failed to mention that.
My thought as well.
Kumar Rocker has thrown 110 innings in the 3 years since he left Vandy. As well as the surgery you mentioned, he had Tommy John surgery in May 2023.
He performed great in 30 innings in AA and AAA last year.
Then had 3 MLB starts last year and was not particularly good.
And he’s had two 1 inning outings this spring and was rocked both times.
Was it a mistake to not tender him a contract?
Ater the mets did not sign Kumar….
But honestly, this is yet another really interesting article that brings me back to MLBTR. As a baseball nerd (not super nerd), I find this kind of Wizard of Oz reveal to be thoroughly fascinating. Its nice to actually hear thoughts of what goes on with front offices and decisions for signing players.
Thanks, Zack! Quite an interesting and look forward to more of your contributions here at MLBTR!
That was a lot of reading I didn’t do to come to the conclusion that Gerritt Cole being allowed to un-opt-out was Brian Cashman’s worst mistake to the tune of 4/$144 and Triston Casas can’t be expected to be healthy until he actually does so for multiple seasons so they might as well trade him straight up for Dylan Cease or *insert Mariners Starter here*
why would anyone ever make a deal with AJ Preller again, given what he did? How did he earn trust back?
I could be wrong but I honestly think the reason you see more players injured today instead of years ago has to do with the amount of money teams have invested in them. Years ago teams would let players play through small nagging injuries but now if anything looks wrong, even if it’s minor, players are being held back from playing for fear of something small turning into something major.
Joe – It’s not minor injuries we are talking about here.
It’s the major injuries, the TJS and the Stantons Elbows and the Casas Ribs.
Without question I do agree these are contributing factors:
1) Excessive weightlifting
2) Excessive pampering of pitchers
3) Excessive max velocity
4) Excessive spin rate
Funny that its 9 years later and this guy still has an axe to grind against preller. Worth noting that the guy the padres got back in that deal was also damaged goods and needed TJ soon after, but nobody talks about that part.
No surprise. Deliberate deception like that is a dog act.
Whatever happened to PLAYING the game? This is why today’s game turns me off. Why be a serious fan when this kind of stuff dominates baseball talk. Somebody hurt? Next man up. Play the damn game and keep these people who are more concerned with off the field junk ($$$)…away from me. Give me the box scores and let the sofa jockeys worry about the other stuff. (Yes I am an old -ucker)
You have the right to skip past articles like this if you don’t find the topic interesting. This page has much more to do with “off the field junk” than anything else, so maybe find another place to browse.
I would like to see a baseball world where salary for injured players does not count against the tax threshold. Injuries happen in this era, but because some teams have set financial limits, getting a second chance to buy a replacement player can help them.
As I understand it, the NFL partnered with GE in developing CTE diagnostic software for their MRI data. MLB might have to throw them some cash to work on an elbow system.
Very cool look behind the curtain at a process we don’t generally hear a lot about.
There’s also a lot of unknown data out there, particularly with draft signees. A kid might have only started a dozen games for his high school team, but how many innings in travel ball, all stars, etc? And how long were they?