When I began working on this model way back in 2011, I defined success based on how often my model was within ten percent of the actual arbitration salary for all arbitration-eligible players who signed one-year deals. The initial goal was to be within ten percent for half of such cases. For the 2011-12 arbitration season, the model was within ten percent on 55% of all cases. The model has consistently been in that range or higher, peaking at 65% in the 2014-15 arbitration season, while only dipping below it once with 54% in 2019-20. It averaged 58% over its first nine years. 

Over that time, I repeatedly ran tests on the model, considered new modeling techniques, and had discussions with agents and others with experience in the arbitration space about how to improve the model. There were steps forward, although after picking each piece of low-hanging fruit, the gains were smaller. Ultimately, I pivoted to a focus on more accurate and cleaner data. This was initially something that Bryan Grosnick helped with behind the scenes, and Darragh McDonald took over last year. They both helped tremendously. 

One important process change that I incorporated into model updates in recent years is checking which players would have been the “biggest misses” after updating the model. In many cases, the salaries that “missed” were not reflective of the actual salaries earned. Yet the model was awkwardly contorting itself to fit those purported outcomes. Some of the process of improving data quality was just a matter of finding typos. But in many cases, it was about correctly identifying the “true” arbitration salary a player received. When players avoid arbitration via settlement, they often get performance bonuses, signing bonuses, options for future years, or multi-year agreements. These cases are incorporated into the modeling process where appropriate, but sometimes the “salary” a player literally earned was not really intended to account for the actual arbitration award he would have gotten at a hearing. Cleaning the data involved some subjectivity, but it was designed to better record the intended salary that teams and agents were treating as a baseline when they negotiated more complicated agreements.

More tedious updates to data accuracy are not the most thrilling part of model building. Coming up with creative mathematical methods or just innovative variables to utilize is a more rewarding intellectual exercise for the researcher. But the truth is that better data is often more important than a slightly smarter model. I will continue to evolve the model based on the relevant statistics and factors utilized in the arbitration process, but in recent years I ultimately improved the model more with better data without structuring it differently.

As a result, the model should be more accurate in future years than it has been in the past. See below for a graph showing the performance of the model each year.

Previous posts: Resolving This Player-Owner Dispute Should Be Easy; MLB Collective Bargaining and Risk Sharing.

There is a way that players can get prorated salaries for a 72-game regular season and the owners can make enough money to only pay the equivalent of 68% of prorated salaries. We know the way that owners will agree to a deal with prorated salaries for 2020; they insist they need the revenue to make up for losses incurred during the regular season. While both owners and players have proposed expanded playoffs as a way to increase that revenue, they have been unable to create enough revenue for the owners to bite. I have a solution for this problem—start the playoffs earlier, add playoff teams, make the series longer, and reap the extra television revenue. There is more than enough there to get a deal done.

The biggest roadblock to completing a deal is the combination of the union’s insistence that players be paid on a prorated basis per regular season game, and the owners’ insistence that players take less than their prorated salaries due to absence of fans in the stands. Players have shown a willingness to extend the playoffs—effectively playing some games for free. Owners have shown some willingness to put on a 50-game shortened season with typical playoff structure, but have balked apparently at the risk of the players filing a grievance for not putting on as long a season as possible.

Eugene Freedman tweeted to me earlier in this series that the reason players were so insistent on prorated salaries is to avoid precedent. If this is true, the only way around this is finding more revenue sources—something the player proposals have hinted at, but not provided adequately to appease owners.

The owners have repeatedly centered on completing the regular season by September 27 and the World Series by the end of October, fearing that a second wave of COVID-19 in the fall could preclude the playoffs.

Fans have an additional concern that my proposal would resolve—they want to make sure that the World Series Champion deserves their title. A shortened season, combined with expanded playoffs, naturally increases the possibility that a mediocre team could walk away with the crown.

They could solve this by ending the regular season 10 days early to end on September 17, using doubleheaders and other ways to get to 72 games (or just shrinking the season further if the players are amenable). Then they would have 10 extra days to get in a lot more playoff games.

My proposal is that playoffs are expanded to 16 teams, but that all 15 series are Best-of-Seven series. On average, this will increase the expected number of nationally broadcast playoff games from 36 to 90 – a whopping increase of 150%. With $787 million reportedly at stake in television revenue for those 36 playoff games, it stands to reason that networks would pay at least half as much for the addition 54 games as the original 36, which brings in something like a whopping $590 million in extra revenue.

If players are content to simply get by on prorated salaries for 72 regular season games, they would receive about $1.84 billion in revenue. The owners’ extra playoff revenue places them in the equivalent position of 68% of prorated salaries. Marginal costs of operating these games are probably small enough to keep this only a couple percent higher. The owners almost certainly need the players to take a haircut smaller than 32%, so there is plenty of room for give in this approach. Even if networks were only willing to pay a third of the per-playoff-game rate, that would still be enough revenue to get owners to effectively pay the equivalent of 79% of prorated salaries. There is probably even room in there to give the players some playoff share, cover some marginal costs of games, and other things that could be required for this to be profitable to owners and acceptable to players.

As a result, the odds that an inferior team wins a given series are lower, and it becomes more likely that a deserving champion is crowned. The league could even take further advantage of the empty-stadium format by tilting home field advantage entirely towards the team with the superior regular season record.

I have researched home field advantage extensively, and have learned that rather than home crowd support or even last at-bats, the real reason home field advantage exists is that players are more familiar with their own parks. Teams who are home for a 7-game series will have a 59% chance of winning an evenly matched series already. A superior team certainly could easily have a 70% chance of winning a series in many cases.

This seems to be something that would accomplish the requisite situation for all parties, and there are many other ways that players could help teams add revenue without sacrificing their prorated salary demand. But the key is many more playoff games, since that is the only way owners make back losses they claim from the regular season, and the only way players do not have to surrender their principle of prorated salaries.

In essence, every proposal floated by the owners has requested that players assume the downside risk associated with lower ticket revenue. Part of the reason I suspect this is offensive to players is that owners have benefited substantially in recent years from upside risk associated with television revenue, and little to none has found its way into player salaries.

To understand why, all we need is a superficial understanding of labor economics. Baseball’s free agent market follows those models better than perhaps either side realizes. Owners offer free agents certain salaries because they believe that their labor will generate as much money in revenue. Yet owners primarily get their revenue from two sources: tickets and television.

Since what free agents are actually selling is wins, the translation from ticket revenue to free agent salaries is obvious. Teams sell more tickets when they win more games. Especially if those wins push them further in the playoffs, they sell substantially more season tickets in subsequent seasons. Teams readily pay free agents with this in mind.

Yet the translation from television revenue to free agents is virtually nonexistent. National television deals with ESPN, TBS, and FOX are distributed to all teams, regardless of how many games they win. Regional Sports Networks often sign multi-decade contracts with teams to broadcast their games, which also are unaltered by win totals in a given season.

The reason this matters, and the reason this is a source of acrimony between the owners and players now, is that television revenue has grown far more quickly than ticket revenue. Player salaries have grown in magnitude about as much as ticket revenues have— suggesting this theory is likely true. Owners have seen higher profits from faster growing television revenue.

Consider my rough estimates in the graph below. Here I have used Baseball Prospectus payroll totals, approximate average ticket prices from various sources, average attendance from Baseball Reference, and Maury Brown’s (now unavailable) BizOfBaseball.com website and Forbes articles for total revenue. None of these figures are exact but they are certainly close enough that the message and pattern is obvious. Players have seen salary growth (red) almost exactly in accordance with the growth rate of ticket revenues (green), while owners’ profits have grown more quickly as they pocket the faster-growing television revenue (blue). This is not the owners pulling the wool over the union’s eyes—it is just the structure of their agreements in which the payroll share of revenue is not fixed as it is in other sports, but tied to owner incentives that have not kept up with total revenue.

If the owners want the players to accept the downside risk associated with low ticket revenue, they need to find a way to share the upside risk associated with higher television revenue.

A starting point is simple. Instead of minimum salaries defined exactly by the CBA, let free agent and arbitration prices be set in excess of the salary minimums, and set future salary minimums distributed to all players. Let those minimums represent some fixed X% of the cumulative national television deals. Bargain about that percentage, but when TBS offers 40% more in their next deal than their current deal, players will see that upside. In exchange, when future identifiable events lower ticket revenue— e.g. say government regulations of Y% reduced capacity in stadiums due to COVID-19 in 2021– the players will accept lower salaries by Z%. This gives players exposure to upside and gives owners protection from downside. Everything else is bargaining around X, Y, and Z%.

Now is the time for the players to request this. Now is the time for the owners to offer this. It need not even be for 2020– that ship may have sailed already. By right now, there is downside risk associated with empty seats associated with 2021. If owners want players to assume lower salaries in such a situation, they should make an offer to give the players a piece of future television revenue growth now. Otherwise, the players will again be asking the owners the same question next year: “Why should we accept this downside risk?”

The MLB Owners and MLB Players Association have been unable to reach an agreement for the financial terms of the 2020 season, and at this point they may not reach one at all. Both sides have focused publicly on the morality of their case, each believing they have the ethical upper hand. Neither has made proposals that reflect their actual negotiating position. That the arguments have primarily focused on morality is perhaps not surprising, but it doesn’t create fertile ground for an actual substantive negotiation. I studied bargaining theory, and I don’t remember anything about how to win a moral argument. The ethics are what they are, and any reasonable person could make either side’s case if they really tried. The union seems to be winning the PR war thus far, as fans seem to mostly blame owners, but supportive tweets from fans are not convertible into currency.

At its core, what we have is the following set up: The presumptive default position, if no agreement is reached, is that commissioner Rob Manfred will order a roughly 50-game season with full prorated salaries. If the sides do reach an agreement, they may play as many as 80 games, and be able to split the associated revenue. They also may be able to add revenue through other avenues like expanded playoffs, and they could split that revenue too. Those are the gains from a negotiated agreement. They can be split in a way to make both parties better off.

Both sides have accused the other of not bargaining in good faith, but neither side has offered the other side anything they would plausibly accept. Instead we have seen the owners repeatedly try to offer players only slightly more than the same salary total as they would with a 50-game season, effectively asking for all the gains that would accrue from a negotiated agreement while leaving the players to absorb greater output and greater risk (both from the usual risk of playing baseball and the additional risk attendant to the global pandemic). The players similarly have failed to offer the owners anything that would lead to more profit than they would accrue in the event of a 50-game season with unexpanded playoffs. It is not surprising negotiations have gone nowhere.

At this point, an agreement for a better, longer season in 2020 is doubtful. But 2021 is right around the corner, and there is no vaccine for COVID-19 yet. We may not see fans in the seats in 2021, or at least we may not see stadiums filled to capacity. So we may see a replay of this argument in 2021 as well. It’s imperative that both sides recognize their position and negotiate accordingly. This acknowledgement could easily flip the script and lead to an expedited deal for 2020 already.

Let’s start with what should be obvious and unarguable.

Unarguable Point A:

Any agreement should see the players earn substantially more than they would have in a 50-game season.

Unarguable Point B:

Any agreement should see owners make more profit than they would in a 50-game season.

Nothing floated publicly has even come close to meeting these simple criteria.

The starting point here is actually fairly simple. Forget about inching towards a middle ground when neither side is willing to budge. Instead, begin by figuring out just how much extra revenue is associated with 30 extra games and an expanded postseason. Then, split it in half. The players’ salary total is equal to that half plus their prorated salaries for 50 games. Both sides may try to argue for a bigger piece of the pie, but either side would be crazy to say no to half of this revenue—which is much more than the zero extra revenue they would see otherwise. The players don’t need the owners to open their books on any more than is necessary to estimate this amount. The owners don’t need to ask the players to sign any waivers or anything else that isn’t already negotiated. Anything on top of this baseline can be negotiated after setting the above in writing and shaking hands (but not actually).

Offers could get more complicated and cover more territory. This is especially true with the risk of no fans or fewer fans in 2021, and with the CBA expiring after 2021. But the essential 2020 issue can be resolved in a fairly simple manner that makes each side better off in the short term while limiting the long-term damage to the sport. In subsequent pieces, I’ll discuss the fundamentals of baseball’s free agent market and how players might want to approach the inequities that have arguably developed over the last couple years. But for now, let’s just agree that owners, players, and fans can all be made much better off very quickly. Get it done before dinnertime.

The Cubs’ Kris Bryant reaches his third year of arbitration coming off a solid campaign in which he hit .281 with 31 home runs and knocked in 77 runs in 634 plate appearances. This comes at the heels of an injury-laden 2018 campaign in which the third baseman/outfielder only played 102 games and hit just 13 home runs. Bryant had received a record deal in 2018 for $10.85MM, after compiling both a Rookie of the Year Award and Most Valuable Player honors prior to reaching arbitration. However, Bryant’s disappointing 2018 only earned him a small $2.05MM raise. The model projects him to get a far more generous $5.9MM raise in 2020 after a healthy season with solid power.

Starting at an obviously very high $12.9MM salary in his second year of arbitration eligibility, it is possible that Bryant’s raise could be affected just by the base salary on which his raise will be added. So it would be useful to look for comparable players with high salary levels.

The other particularly notable distinction in Bryant’s number is that 77 RBI is a fairly small total for a hitter with 31 homers.  A good comp would be a player who hit for similar power, without knocking in many runs either.

Fellow third baseman Josh Donaldson emerges as a possibility with his $6MM in 2018. He hit .270/33/78, obviously quite similar to Bryant’s .282/31/77. However, Donaldson only had 496 plate appearances. Additionally, Donaldson was actually in his fourth year of arbitration eligibility (Bryant is in his third year). Furthermore, Donaldson was somewhat of a unique case coming off a two-year deal. However, $6MM seems at least plausible for Bryant.

Another third baseman to consider as a ceiling is Nolan Arenado last year. Arenado got an $8.25MM raise off a very high base salary of $17.75MM, after putting up a .297/38/110 line in 673 plate appearances. Despite the hitter’s park augmenting those numbers, Arenado’s case appeared to be stronger than Bryant’s, and $8.25MM is likely a ceiling for Bryant’s potential raise.

Didi Gregorius might be a potential floor. Back in 2018, the shortstop received a $3.15MM raise after hitting .287 with 25 home runs and 87 runs batted in. Gregorius played a harder position and actually topped Bryant on both batting average and runs batted in, but Bryant’s extra six home runs suggest Gregorius is probably a floor.

Another floor could be Manny Machado two years ago, as he hit .259 with 33 homers and 95 runs RBI, and got a $4.5MM increase.

Overall, I think the model gets Bryant’s raise about right. He should safely land between Machado’s $4.5MM raise and Arenado’s $8.25MM upgrade, and probably closer to Machado. Donaldson’s $6MM raise, his contractual differences notwithstanding, probably is a reasonable guess as to Bryant’s salary and is only $400K larger than the model projects.

As first-year arbitration awards continue to grow with the revenue and payrolls in baseball today, they provide higher platforms through which arbitration records in later years can be more easily broken. Mookie Betts will go through the arbitration process one more time after earning $20.1MM including bonuses during his penultimate year through the arb process, putting him in line to potentially break Nolan Arenado’s record of $26MM his last time through arbitration. Betts’ potential salary is high enough that he has frequently been featured in trade rumors as the Red Sox seek to reset themselves below the luxury tax threshold in 2020.

Either way, Betts’ case is going to simultaneously take a large chunk of someone’s payroll while also being a relative bargain to similarly-producing free agents. After a historic season in 2018 in which Betts hit 32 home runs, stole 30 bases, and racked up an amazing slash line of .346/.438/.640, Betts had a slightly more pedestrian year — by his standards — in 2019. Betts batted .295 and hit 29 home runs while stealing 16 bases, while recording 80 RBI and a league-leading 135 runs scored.

The model uses the generally accurate fact that players’ salaries in subsequent years in arbitration are determined as raises based on their platform year production alone. So while Betts may not have had a historic season, he does have a good case for breaking Arenado’s record, thanks to Betts’ $20.1MM salary in 2019. My model projects a $7.6MM raise for 2020, which would land the Red Sox outfielder at $27.7MM.

Even coming down to earth in 2019, Betts still put up rare numbers. There are very few hitters who have reached their third year of arbitration eligibility with at least 25 home runs and double-digit stolen bases in their platform year — in the last five years, only four players hit both plateaus. Charlie Blackmon got a $6.7MM raise in 2018 after hitting .331 with 37 homers, 104 RBI, and 14 steals the prior year.

Although Blackmon’s batting average obviously bested Betts’ .295, the other three hitters had far lower averages. Todd Frazier hit .225 with 40 HR, 98 RBI, and 15 steals and got just a $3.75MM raise in 2017. Didi Gregorius hit .268/27/86 with 10 stolen bases and got a $3.5MM raise last year, while Aaron Hicks hit .248/27/79 with 11 stolen bases last year en route to a $3.2MM raise.  Still, the Red Sox could argue that Betts may deserve a smaller bump over Frazier, Gregorius, and Hicks, and potentially less than Blackmon’s $6.7MM.

Obviously, we are limiting the potential list of comparables by requiring double-digit stolen bases. A couple more recent names (both third basemen) emerge when dropping that requirement. Anthony Rendon got a $6.5MM raise in 2018 after putting up a solid .301/25/100 campaign — and that could easily serve as a benchmark for Betts. Arenado last year got an $8.25MM raise after a .297/38/110 season. Given that Arenado’s numbers were at Coors Field, Betts could certainly argue for that as a basis.

I suspect Betts would be able to successfully argue for at least topping Rendon’s $6.5MM, although Blackmon’s $6.7MM could be a ceiling. I could see Betts even getting up to an $8.25MM raise like Arenado did last year as well, though that might be more difficult. Based on this list of potential comps, the $5.9MM Betts would need to break Arenado’s record definitely seems doable if not guaranteed, and the model’s $7.6MM projection does seem out of reach either.

George Springer enters his final year of arbitration eligibility after playing out a two-year, $24MM deal that covered his 2018-19 seasons. Springer only played in 122 games last season due to a hamstring strain, but he still managed to belt 39 home runs and knock in 96 runs despite consistently batting in the leadoff spot — all while hitting .292. While being limited to 556 plate appearances could hurt an otherwise strong arbitration case, his impressive counting stats should get him a hefty raise.

Players outside their first year of arbitration eligibility are generally awarded raises on top of their prior salary and only based on the prior year of production. In general, Springer would not expect to receive different compensation than he would have based on his .265/22/71 performance in 620 plate appearances in 2018. However, cases like Springer’s can sometimes be considered as “re-slot” cases where they are paid based on career performance or at least on the two prior years that were covered under a multi-year deal.

Further complicating matters is that the salary on which Springer’s raise will be based is not all that clear. Springer received $24MM for his two-year pact, in matching installments of $12MM per season. However, he would never have earned $12MM in arbitration in 2018 (in fact, he filed for $10.5MM), and he was obviously compensated under the assumption that he would have received more than $12MM in 2019 had he gone year to year.

In cases like this, in which the player and team have both filed at the time the multi-year deal was reached, I usually assume the first year of the deal was valued at the midpoint of the team’s and player’s filing. In this case, that’d put year one of Springer’s two-year deal at $9.5MM, since the Astros filed at $8.5MM. The 2019 base salary, then, would be be treated as $14.5MM.

Based on his performance, my model estimates a $6.9MM raise, which would take Springer to $21.4MM if we use that theoretical $14.5MM sum as his base. If we look for useful comps, this seems somewhat plausible. Unfortunately, two of the players who have similar power numbers and service time both played half their games at Coors Field, inflating their statistics. Charlie Blackmon hit 37 home runs with 104 runs batted in in 2017, although his case was stronger than Springer’s in some ways because he hit .331 and racked up 725 plate appearances. That all earned him a $6.7MM raise. The following year, Nolan Arenado got an $8.25MM raise after his 38 HR and 110 RBI, while hitting .297 in 673 plate appearances.

Neither Blackmon nor Arenado looks exactly right. Arenado plays third base. Blackmon hit for higher average. Both had more plate appearances. Additionally, Blackmon was only eligible for arbitration for the third time, unlike Arenado and Springer, who had four arb-eligible years due to their status as Super Two players. Also, Blackmon and Arenado further differ because both received raises after one-year deals. We know Springer’s case to be less common, as he’s coming off a two-year contract.

Springer’s case is very arguably most similar to Josh Donaldson’s case two years ago. Donaldson put up a .270/33/78 season in 496 plate appearances and, crucially, was coming off a two-year deal in which he was paid $28.65MM. That sum was neatly allocated as $11.65MM (roughly the midpoint of his and the Blue Jays’ arbitration filings) in the first year, and $17MM the second year. Donaldson got an even $6MM raise to $23MM in his final year of arbitration. With Springer topping Donaldson in batting average, homers and RBIs at .292/39/96 in 556 plate appearances, it stands to reason that Donaldson would likely get a larger raise. Perhaps that would be similar to his $6.9MM projected raise.

On the other hand, the first year of Donaldson’s two-year pact was better than year one of Springer’s deal. Donaldson hit .284/37/99 in 700 plate appearances, compared to Springer’s .265/22/71 in 620 plate appearances. If that’s part of what is being considered, we’re comparing Donaldson’s combined .270/70/177 performance in 1196 trips to the plate against Springer’s .278/61/167 performance in 1176 plate appearances. In that case, Springer isn’t necessarily a lock to top Donaldson’s $6MM raise.

The only other remotely similar case was Todd Frazier three years ago. He was coming off a two-year deal that effectively paid him $7.5MM. He got a $4.5MM raise after hitting just .225 but with 40 HR, 98 RBI and 15 stolen bases in 666 turns at the plate. This would probably establish $4.5MM as a floor if Donaldson is not already serving as a floor at $6MM.

Overall, it seems pretty clear that the best comp for Springer is Donaldson. Springer should get somewhere in the neighborhood of the $21.4MM that my model has projected him for, albeit perhaps for reasons very different from those the model considered in his case.

Josh Hader just barely qualified for early arbitration eligibility as a Super Two, significantly boosting his career earning outlook. He did so on the heels of his first season as a full-time closer. Hader saved 37 games in 2019, after saving just 12 games in his career beforehand. However, Hader has consistently pitched in high leverage innings, accumulating 39 career holds, and has put up phenomenal strikeout numbers and a low ERA. In less than three full seasons, Hader has struck out 349 hitters in 240.2 innings and put up a 2.42 ERA. My model projects him to earn $4.6MM in his run through arbitration.

A typical comparable for Hader would be someone who had a full platform year as a closer, but only limited saves prior to that, while having a lower ERA and a lot of strikeouts. The closest comparable is probably Ken Giles two years ago. He had 34 platform saves (to Hader’s 37) and 65 career saves (to Hader’s 49). He struck out 336 hitters in his career, but just 83 in his platform year. Hader struck out 349 in his career, but had 138 in his platform year. Giles’ 2.30 platform year ERA was similar to Hader’s 2.62, and his career 2.43 ERA was almost exactly spot on Hader’s 2.42. Giles earned $4.6MM. Overall it is not clear which of Giles or Hader should earn more, which means the $4.6MM projection to match Giles is probably about right.

This is reinforced by the fact that the other three players in the last five years with 30 saves in their platform year and between 40 and 65 saves in their career all earned between $4.1 and $4.2MM, each back in 2016. Those were Hector Rendon, Cody Allen, and Jeurys Familia. They all had ERA in the mid 2’s as well, ranging from 2.42 to 2.82.

The one thing that sticks out about Hader beyond that list is his very high strikeout rate. That distinguishes him from all of these other relievers who fell short of triple-digit strikeouts in their platform year. Hader’s 138 strikeouts topped all four aforementioned closers.

Another avenue could be to ignore old-fashioned stats like saves and holds and see if anyone else has similar strikeout numbers out of the bullpen. Ultimately, this was limited. I looked for any reliever in the last five years who entered arbitration for the first time with at least 120 strikeouts in their platform year and 300 in their career. That only yielded Dellin Betances, who earned $3MM three years ago, despite only 22 career saves. (That came after he lost a high-stakes hearing in which he sought $5MM.) That would certainly provide a floor, but it is clear that Hader should be well above this anyway.

Ultimately, I think it is safe to assume he lands close to his $4.6MM projection. I could see some upside if his strikeouts are considered more heavily, but since relievers generally get paid based on saves and holds, I do not think he will exceed his projection by much.

Trevor Bauer’s arbitration cases have gone to a hearing two years in a row, and he has emerged victorious both times. However, his 2019 performance was weaker in several ways, and it remains to be seen how big a raise he can get over his $13MM salary from 2019 in his last year before reaching free agency.

My model does see him getting a sizable $5.6MM raise, mainly due to his career-high 213 innings and 253 strikeouts. After putting up a 2.21 ERA in 2018, Bauer regressed back to a 4.48 ERA in 2019 and actually had a losing record of 11-13 for the first time in four years. This was not merely bad luck either. His FIP worsened by nearly two runs as well, going from 2.44 to 4.34. Of course, with a very low HR/FB in 2018, his FIP benefited. But SIERA adjusts for this and still saw nearly a one-run deterioration from 3.21 to 4.14 for Bauer. Bauer walked a career high 82 hitters while allowing 34 home runs. Despite his higher strikeout total, his K/9 fell slightly from 11.3 to 10.7 in 2019.

Arbitration panels do not use sabermetric stats like FIP or SIERA very frequently, so Bauer’s case will largely come down to his robust 213 innings versus his 4.48 ERA. Finding similar comparables is tricky, but several potential pitchers do emerge.

If we focus on pitchers with at least 180 innings pitched but ERA’s over 4.0 who were entering arbitration for the third or fourth time, we get four pitchers in recent years that seem comparable. Each got raises between $3.0 and $3.55MM, obviously less than Bauer’s $5.6 million projection. Of course, none struck out hitters at anywhere near the clip that Bauer did. Patrick Corbin in 2018 had the highest total strikeouts of the bunch with 178 in 189.2 innings and a 4.03 ERA to go along with a 14-13 record. He got a $3.55MM raise. With fewer innings and way fewer strikeouts, Corbin’s case is clearly weaker. Tanner Roark’s 9-15, 4.34 performance in 180.1 innings earned him a similar raise last year ($3.53MM), while Andrew Cashner’s 184.2 innings and 6-16, 4.34 performance only got him $3.1MM back in 2016. Hector Santiago got a $3.0MM boost in 2017 after going 13-10 with a 4.70 ERA in 182 innings. Each of these four pitchers had a weaker case than Bauer, so his floor is probably in the mid-3’s.

If we flip things to look for pitchers with similar strikeout totals, only three guys with similar service time had 225 strikeouts going into their third of fourth year of arbitration during the last five years. David Price got a $5.75MM raise five years ago after a 15-12, 3.26 campaign, in which he threw 248.1 innings and struck out 271 batters. That case is probably somewhat stale though, even if Price clearly had a better case than Bauer does now. More recently, Gerrit Cole got a $6.75MM raise last year and Jacob deGrom had a $9.6MM raise. The 1.70 ERA that deGrom posted en route to a Cy Young Award clearly makes him a poor comparable for Bauer. Even Cole’s 2.88 ERA is a run and a half better than Bauer’s 4.48. Cole went 15-5 in 200.1 innings and struck out 276. Cole’s $6.75MM raise is obviously a ceiling.

It seems unlikely that Bauer will fall below Patrick Corbin’s $3.55MM raise or best Cole’s $6.75MM raise, and should land somewhere in between. To get the $5.6MM the model projects, he may need to argue that Price’s $5.75MM raise from 2015 is too stale to be relevant, which puts him somewhere in the vague range between Corbin and Cole. I suspect Bauer may not get quite up to that point, although if he does take his case to a panel again, he could quite easily get there if the Reds aim too low. Bauer will certainly be an interesting reference point for pitchers with significant innings and strikeout totals who put up mediocre traditional statistics in future years, since it is obvious that few such cases currently exist.

Indians right-hander Mike Clevinger only started 21 games in 2019, but when he was healthy, he was dominant. Despite being limited to 126 innings, the 29-year-old had a 13-4 record and 2.71 ERA with 169 strikeouts — all numbers that will factor strongly into his arbitration case. In his career, Clevinger already has a 41-21 record and a 3.20 ERA in 500 2/3 innings. My model projects him at $4.5MM the first time through arbitration, but finding comparables is tricky due to his missed time in his platform year.

To look for comparables, I focused on a rather narrow scope: first-time eligible pitchers in the past five years who pitched between 75 and 150 innings with a sub-4.00 ERA in their platform year and who had 35-plus career wins.

Gerrit Cole in 2017 and Kyle Hendricks in 2018 were the only two pitchers to match those specifications. The former got $3.75MM, and the latter got $4.18MM. Both of those pitchers only won seven games in their platform season, however. Cole did have 47 career wins, topping Clevinger’s 41, but his platform ERA of 3.88 is clearly worse than Clevinger’s 2.71. Hendricks is more comparable, with a robust 2.94 career ERA that is similar to Clevinger’s 3.20. Hendricks’ 38-22 record favorably compares to Clevinger’s 41-21 mark as well. Hendricks makes for a pretty good comp, and adding two years of inflation onto his first-time arbitration salary would probably put Clevinger right around the $4.5MM that the model projects for him.

Another potential comparable who had fewer career wins and a weaker platform season, but was otherwise fairly similar, is Jacob deGrom back in 2017. He went 7-8 with a 3.90 ERA in 148 innings in his platform year, but he had a 2.74 career ERA and a 30-22 record with 479 1/3 innings. DeGrom got $3.9MM his first time through arbitration. This is a likely floor for Clevinger—it seems clear that he should safely exceed $4MM.

What is tricky about first-time eligible pitchers is that for more than a decade, they have rarely broken the $4.5MM barrier. Three pitchers did as part of multi-year deals: Tim Lincecum in 2010, Clayton Kershaw in 2012, and Lance Lynn in 2015. However, Kershaw had a Cy Young Award on his resume, and Lincecum had two. Lynn was a unique multi-year deal that was extremely flat (three years, $22MM), so the $7MM attributed to the first year is not really a reliable number on which to base any Clevinger predictions. The only first-time eligible pitcher who signed a one-year deal worth more than $4.5MM was Dallas Keuchel, who landed a $7.25MM salary after earning a Cy Young Award.

All told, when you consider Clevinger being limited to 21 starts in 2019, he seems unlikely to be the one who breaks the $4.5MM barrier that has been so difficult for first-time pitchers to surpass. However, it also seems likely that he should hit Hendricks’ $4.18MM salary — and probably exceed it. Viewed through this lens, Clevinger appears likely to get close to his model-projected salary.

Cody Bellinger seeks to break the record for first-time eligible players in 2020, after putting up an MVP campaign in his platform season to tack onto a resume that already has a Rookie of the Year award. Bellinger hit 47 home runs and knocked in 115, while batting .305 and stealing 15 bases through 661 plate appearances. For his career, that gives Bellinger 111 HR, 288 RBI, a .278 average, and 39 steals in 1841 plate appearances. That immediately puts him in rarified air.

In recent memory, only three players have entered arbitration for the first-time with both an ROY and an MVP award. Ryan Howard smashed the first-time eligible arbitration record way back in 2008 with these accomplishments. He had also hit 47 home runs in his platform season, but had batted only .268 (although he did knock in 136 runs). His 129 career home runs and 353 career RBI, plus his .291 career average, led to a $10MM salary after he beat the Phillies in arbitration (who had filed for only $7MM).

It took five more years for another player to reach arbitration with an ROY and MVP, and that was Buster Posey. Posey had only hit 24 HR in his platform year though, and 46 in his career, and ended up with a less remarkable $8MM.

It was not until Kris Bryant again accomplished that combination in 2018 that we saw Ryan Howard’s decade-old record fall as Bryant earned $10.85MM. Bryant is the most obvious comparable for Bellinger here. Bryant had a .295/29/73 platform in 665 PA, which is definitely weaker than Bellinger’s .305/47/115 in 661 PA—especially because Bellinger stole 15 bases to Bryant’s seven. For career numbers, Bryant also fell short in HR (94 versus 111), RBI (274 versus 288), and SB (28 versus 39), but he did have a .288 average to Bellinger’s .278. Of course, batting average has historically been far less important than power numbers for arbitration cases, so it stands to reason Bellinger should top Bryant’s $10.85MM. My model estimates $11.6MM, which may be on the low side.

Finding other comparable players is quite challenging. Two other players have received eight figure salaries in their first year of eligibility. Mookie Betts in 2018 had a .264/24/102 platform year, but had 26 stolen bases that season as well as a career .292/78/310 line and 80 total stolen bases. He got $10.55MM, and Bellinger’s case also looks favorable to his. Last year, Francisco Lindor had a platform .277/38/92 campaign with 25 SB, along with .288/98/310 career along with 71 SB. Lindor received $10.55MM. Again, Bellinger’s case compares favorably.

Overall, this seems likely to just be a matter of how much Bellinger will break Bryant’s record by. I think the floor is probably the $850K difference that the model projects (at $11.6MM), and I could easily see Bellinger landing north of $12MM or perhaps even $13MM.

Francisco Lindor enters his second year of arbitration eligibility coming off a $10.55MM salary in 2019, yet another solid campaign. Lindor hit .284 with 32 home runs and 74 runs batted in, stole 22 bases, and accumulated 654 plate appearances on the way to his fourth straight All-Star appearance and his second Gold Glove. My model projects Lindor earn $16.7MM, good for a $6.15MM raise.

It is very difficult to find comparable players for the talented shortstop. Looking for middle infielders from the past half-decade who hit 25 home runs going into their second year of eligibility provides only two names. Both players are second basemen and have much weaker cases than Lindor. In 2017, Jonathan Schoop batted .293 with 32 home runs and 105 runs batted in, stealing just a single base. The same year, Scooter Gennett hit .295 with 27 homers, 97 runs batted in and just three stolen bases. They got raises of $5.0 and $3.2 million, respectively. Considering Lindor stole way more stolen bases and plays a more premium position, he clearly has a better case. He should earn north of the $5MM raise that Schoop received three years ago.

Looking for a shortstop is clearly not a fruitful endeavor, though. The largest ever raise for a second-time-eligible shortstop was $2.83MM for Brandon Crawford in 2016. But he only hit .256, belted just 21 home runs, and stole a mere six bases. His case then was clearly inferior to Lindor’s now.

If we expand to look at other positions beyond the middle infield, some other potential names emerge. George Springer got a two-year deal when he had a similar .283/34/85 performance two seasons ago—although only with five stolen bases—but he had filed for a $6.6MM raise, while the Astros offered a $4.6MM increase. His two-year agreement probably assumes the midpoint. If nothing else, the $4.6MM figure is a floor if Schoop’s $5 million was not.

Justifying the model’s estimate of a $6.15MM raise is harder. But some of the players who have landed raises in that neighborhood had stronger performances. Khris Davis got a $5.5MM raise two years ago after belting 43 home runs and knocking in 110 runs. Davis hit at his standard .247 clip, but his power numbers may make him a ceiling for Lindor. Of course, the positional adjustment is hard. Marcell Ozuna picked up a $5.5MM raise in 2018, too, after he hit .312/37/124 as an outfielder. Still, one could argue that Lindor’s .284/32/74 line is inferior.

I think that somewhere between $5MM and $5.5MM is a reasonable guess for Lindor, which would put him around $15.5MM to $16MM. The model is clearly struggling to find where Lindor’s salary as is, just like we have done in this article, but I do think it landed high.

Jonathan Villar is projected for a hefty raise in his third year of arbitration eligibility in 2019, thanks to a significant improvement over his performance the prior two years.  Villar hit for a career-high 24 home runs and 73 runs batted in last season, while also hitting .274 and stealing 40 bases.  Villar appeared in all 162 of the Orioles’ games, accumulating 714 plate appearances.  After Villar earned $4.825MM in 2019, my model projects him to more than double that amount, with a $5.575MM raise to a $10.4MM salary for 2020.  However, there really are not many useful comparables to work with in Villar’s case.

Very few players with Villar’s service time have similar profiles in terms of home runs and stolen bases. There is only one such player who had more than half as many of each in the last five years — Eduardo Nunez, who also stole 40 bases and hit 16 home runs back in 2016, while batting .288 and knocking in 67 runs over 141 games and 595 PA.  Other than VIllar’s eight extra home runs, Nunez does look similar, albeit with fewer plate appearances (119 less than Villar) and games played (21 less).  Nunez only got a $2.7MM raise, so add in some inflation and the effect of the extra home runs and extra games, and maybe Villar could get close to a $4MM raise, but that is still far short of the model’s $5.575MM raise estimate.

Looking for players with over 700 PA in the last two years, we find Cesar Hernandez from last year and Charlie Blackmon from two years ago, though Blackmon isn’t a comparable since his case relies more on overall hitting numbers than power and speed (.331 average, 34 homers, 104 RBI, 14 steals for Blackmon in 2017).  Hernandez got a $2.65MM raise last offseason coming off a 2018 campaign that saw him post a .253 average, 15 home runs, and 60 RBI, to go along with 19 steals.  This is an obvious floor for Villar, as he should clearly exceed this range.

Also from last year, Didi Gregorius may be a more realistic floor for Villar. He got a $3.5MM raise after hitting .268 with 27 HR and 86 RBI — all similar to Villar — but only stealing 10 bases.  Of course, Gregorius only had 569 PA, far less than Villar’s 714 PA.  Villar should certainly clear $3.5MM as well.

My best guess is Villar gets a raise of around $4MM to $4.5MM.  The model may be estimating high because it is rewarding him heavily for his 714 plate appearances.  Although the model has clearly established that the average effect of more plate appearances really compounds, there may be exceptions in cases like these.  I do not think Villar reaches the $5.575MM raise estimate, so he should land closer to $9MM than the $10.4MM the model forecast.

Josh Bell established himself as a formidable power hitter just in time for his platform year, leading into his first time through the arbitration process. The first baseman hit 37 home runs and knocked in 116 while batting .277—all career highs. Despite being a far less productive hitter prior to 2019, Bell still accumulated some decent career numbers as well thanks to playing full-time for three consecutive seasons. He totaled 78 home runs and 287 RBIs, along with a .265 average. My model projects Bell to earn $5.9 million his first time through arbitration.

The model does not explicitly pick comparables when generating its projection, but it will logically place Bell near some of his most similar hitters while compensating for some salary inflation. Bell’s arbitration case is pretty well-established—he is a hitter who had an elite power year in his platform with solid but non-elite performance prior to that.

Ideally, a comparable player is somebody who plays the same position. But looking for hitters who already play first base full-time before reaching arbitration is challenging.

Chris Carter had similar power numbers when he entered arbitration in 2015, but a far inferior batting average and was also a DH for most of his platform season. He earned $4.18MM after hitting 37 home runs and knocking in 88 his platform season, a totaling 85 HR and 216 RBI in his career. But his platform batting average was only .227 and his career average was .222. This is obviously a likely floor for Bell, who five years later has bested Carter in each of these categories.

Wil Myers obviously played a few positions by the time he entered arbitration in 2017, but commonly played first base. He hit .259 with 28 home runs and 94 runs batted in during his platform year, but stole 28 bases. He only hit 55 home runs in his career though, far less than Bell’s 78. So Myers’ $4.5MM salary seems likely to be low as well.

If we expand to other positions on the diamond, I can find four other infielders in the last five years who hit at least 30 home runs in their platform year and batted at least .250, but did not have 90 home runs in their career, putting them in a similar position to Bell. Each of the four players earned between $5.0MM and $5.2MM and has similarities to Bell.

Last season, Javier Baez entered arbitration with a .290/34/111 platform but stole 21 bases, and had .267/81/269 career numbers to go along with 49 steals. The numbers are certainly similar to Bell, if a little bit better, and Baez plays a harder position. Baez’s $5.2 million could be a benchmark for determining Bell’s 2020 earnings.

Trevor Story also had a similar case going into last season, with a .291/37/108 line in his platform year, and a .268/88/262 line for his career. Story plays a harder position and steals bases at a regular clip as well—27 in his platform year. Story’s $5.0MM could also be a solid benchmark for Bell.

Going back to 2016, we also find a couple third basemen with similar batting numbers to Bell. Both Manny Machado and Nolan Arenado got $5.0MM. Machado hit .286/35/86 platform and .281/68/215 career, while Arenado had a .287/42/130 platform and a .281/70/243 career. Machado had stolen 20 bases in his platform as well. Both arguably had better cases than Bell, but being four years old, these cases are a bit stale.

I think that the model could be a little high on Bell, projecting him for $5.9MM when he may land closer to $5.0MM. It is clear that he should outearn other recent first basemen who got salaries in the low-to-mid $4MM range, but not clear enough that some of the 3B and SS who earned $5.0MM to $5.2MM have weaker cases at all. Salary inflation could push him past them, but I suspect he will land right around $5 million.

Khris Davis enters his third year of arbitration under somewhat familiar conditions—with a .247 average (matching his exact batting average in each season from 2015 through 2017) and at least 40 home runs in his platform season. Coincidences aside, my model sees him getting his biggest raise ever, a $7.6MM bump, good for an $18.1MM salary projection. Last year, he got a $5.5MM raise from his initial $5MM salary in his first year of arbitration.

With career highs of 48 home runs and 123 runs batted in, it is pretty logical that Davis is projected to get his biggest raise yet. On top of that, the same type of performance in the third year of arbitration eligibility is typically associated with a larger raise than it would in the second year of eligibility.

Davis’ case obviously hinges on his power numbers, which is certainly a fortunate skill to possess when it comes to arbitration; power is the skill the arbitration system favors most heavily. Looking for appropriate comparables for Davis is going to require looking for other players who have had significant tallies of the right counting stats, so we should restrict our search to prominent sluggers.

Somewhat surprisingly, in the past decade, only one player has hit 40 home runs going into his third year of arbitration: Todd Frazier, two years ago. Frazier only hit .225 that year and fell just short of 100 RBIs with 98. Davis hit eight more home runs than Frazier did, too. Putting that together, we get an absolute floor of the $3.75MM raise from Frazier’s case.

Even if we soften the home run requirement to 35 and require 100 RBIs, we only get one player in the past five years: Charlie Blackmon, last year. He got a $6.7MM raise for hitting .331 with 37 home runs and 104 runs batted in. There was some debate last year about whether that was enough of a raise, with some rival agents taking shots through the media claiming he should have gotten more. If applied back to Blackmon’s case, the current iteration model does project his 2017 season to support a larger raise of $7.8 million. That also means that the model slightly prefers that season, with its lofty batting average but lesser power stats, to the one just turned in by Davis. All things considered, Blackmon seems like a pretty solid overall comparable, one that either side in the Davis case could argue off of.

It is difficult to come up with other comparables in recent years, but if Davis and the A’s go further back, they might want to look for someone who led the league in home runs like Davis did going into his third year of arbitration. That would be Matt Kemp, who got a $5.05 million raise for his .324/39/126 season in 2011. That is obviously very stale, but it makes it plausible that Davis could get a similar kind of raise with inflation, although his batting average was obviously worse.

With so few plausible comparables, it is difficult to know what Davis could command. In such situations, I would lean towards the model, especially without much evidence that the number was too high or too low. Regardless, in the current era with so many home runs being hit league wide, it will be interesting to see how this affects future cases for guys like Davis who hit so many home runs. Of course, we may not get to see a one-year settlement. The relationship seems to be working for both sides and all involved surely remain mindful of the open market’s devaluation of sluggers, so it would not be surprising to see a multi-year agreement of some kind.